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 The relation of the Muses in ancient Greece, especially during the 
archaic and the beginning of the classical period with which this paper is 
concerned, to the notion of memory is apparent first by their very name: the 
word mousa can be related to the verb mimnêskô (“remind,” “bring, put in 
mind”).
1
 Around the seventh century B.C.E., in his poem entitled Theogony, 
Hesiod commemorates the birth of the Muses and identifies them as the 
daughters of the goddess Mnemosyne and Zeus (lines 53-65). Indeed, 
Memory is well known as the mother of the Muses. According to a passage 
in Plutarch, the Muses were also called Mneiai (Memories) in some places.2 
And Pausanias tells us that the Muses were three in number and had the 
names of Meletê (Practice), Mnêmê (Memory) and Aoidê (Song).3 Each one, 
in other words, bore the name of an essential aspect of poetical function. As 
rhythmical song, the Muse is inseparable from poetic Memory and is 
necessary for the poet’s inspiration as well as for his oral composition. From 
the perspective of our present argument, it is significant that Memory and 
the Muses are also closely connected with the notion of persuasion. 
4
 
 
 
 
                                                
1
 On this etymology and its meaning, see Assaël 2000:40 ff. For the Muses in 
general, see Queyrel 1992.  
 
2
 Plutarch, Moralia, 743D: “Actually all the Muses are said to be called Mneiai 
(Memories) in some places, as is the case of Chios” (italics mine; trans. by Sandbach 
1961). 
 
3
 Pausanias 9.29. 2-3. See also Detienne 1967:10-15.  
 
4
 Cf. Plutarch, Moralia, 745D: “Necessity is a thing devoid of art; it is Persuasion 
(Peithô) that is ‘musical’ and dear to the Muses” (trans. by Sandbach 1961).  
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The Proem of Hesiod’s Theogony 
 
Hesiod begins his Theogony with a “Hymn to the Nine Muses”; in 
lines 77-79, he gives the list of their names. We may note again a passage 
from Plutarch who around 100 C.E. mentions the Hesiodic Muses in a way 
that will help introduce the section of the Theogony’s proem under 
discussion here.
5
 Herodes, a teacher of rhetoric, mentions there the muse 
Calliope in particular and her special relation, in Hesiod, to the kings. He is 
referring to lines 80-103 of the Hesiodic proem, which concern the power of 
the Muses to intervene in human affairs; more precisely, Hesiod mentions 
the gifts of the Muses to men, rulers and poets. He enumerates the Muses 
and finally sets Calliope apart:  
 
Kalliovph q?: h} de; proferestavth ejsti;n aJpasevwn. 
h} ga;r kai; basileu`sin a{m? aijdoivoisin ojphdei`         80?
o{n tina timhvswsi Dio;~ kou`rai megavloio 
geinovmenovn te i[dwsi diotrefevwn basilhvwn, 
tw`/ me;n ejpi; glwvssh/ glukerh;n ceivousin ejevrshn, 
tou` d? e[pe? ejk stovmato~ rJei` meivlica: oiJ de te laoi; 
pavnte~ ej~ aujto;n oJrw`si diakrivnonta qevmista~         85?
ijqeivh/si divkh/sin: o} d? ajsfalevw~ ajgoreuvwn 
ai\yav ke kai; mevga nei`ko~ ejpistamevnw~ katevpausen: 
tou[neka ga;r basilh`e~ ejcevfrone~, ou{neka laoi`~ 
blaptomevnoi~ ajgorh`fi metavtropa e[rga teleu`si 
rJhidivw~, malakoi`si paraifavmenoi ejpevessin.         90 
ejrcovmenon d? ajn? ajgw`na qeo;n w}~ iJlavskontai 
aijdoi` meilicivh/, meta; de; prevpei ajgromevnoisin: 
toivh Mousavwn iJerh; dovsi~ ajnqrwvpoisin. 
 
…and Calliope, who is the chiefest of them all, for she attends on 
worshipful princes: whomsoever of heaven-nourished princes the 
daughters of great Zeus honour, and behold him at his birth, they pour 
sweet dew upon his tongue, and from his lips flow gracious words. All the 
people look towards him while he settles causes with true judgements: and 
he, speaking surely, would soon make wise and even of a great quarrel; for 
therefore are there princes wise in heart, because when the people are 
                                                
5
 Plutarch, Moralia, 743C: “After this we made libations to the Muses and, having 
sung a paean to their Leader, joined Erato in singing to the lyre Hesiod’s verses about the 
birth of the Muses. When the song was over, Herodes the teacher of rhetoric spoke up. 
“You hear,” said he, “you who try to drag Calliope away from us rhetoricians, how 
Hesiod says that she is to be found in the company of kings...” (italics mine; trans. by 
Sandbach 1961). 
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being misguided in their assembly, they set right the matter again with 
ease, persuading them with gentle words. And when he passes through a 
gathering, they greet him as a god with gentle reverence, and he is 
conspicuous amongst the assembled: such is the holy gift of the Muses to 
men.
6
 
 
Calliope is the most outstanding of the group because through her the 
transition is made from the Muses to the revered princes. This introduction 
of kings in the proem and their dependence on Calliope has seemed 
irrelevant and quite strange to some commentators.7 Normally, the Muses 
are the goddesses of poetry, whereas princes or kings depend on Zeus; but, 
at the same time, Hesiod demonstrates the relationship between poet and 
king, whom he clearly thinks of as parallel beneficiaries of Calliope’s favor.
8
 
Only Calliope can bestow the Muses’ gift on the kings and link poetry to the 
royal art of persuasion. Her name literally means “beauty of voice,”
9
 which 
confers the power of persuasion on both the poetic performance and the 
royal functions: she bestows on both the gift of an efficient utterance. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that this parallel is Hesiod’s innovation, and 
in fact the Theogony is the only extant poem in which the Muses are said to 
aid rulers as well as poets (Thalmann 1984:140, espec. n. 18). 
It is important to my argument that the king is visualized in the proem 
of the Theogony as he pronounces his judgment. To settle their quarrel the 
two parties would come before the king and state their case; the king must 
then settle the dispute by pronouncing a legally binding decision (themis). 
Because the Muses inspire him, he can decide the case with straight 
judgments. He is a worshipful king10 because thanks to the gift of eloquence 
he is able to make good judgments (diakrinonta themistas, 85) and reach 
                                                
6
 Italics mine; trans. by Evelyn-White 1982. 
 
7
 See, for example, West’s reaction (1966:182), “Why are the kings introduced at 
all? They are not usually regarded by the Greeks as being dependent upon the Muses, 
except for the celebration of their renown.” Cf. Blößner 2005:27ff. 
 
8
 Cf. the analysis of this parallelism by Laks (1996). 
 
9
 Cf. Liddell 1996: s.v. Kalliopê, hê, (kalê+ops), “the beautiful-voiced” (also 
Kalliopeia). Her name takes us back to line 68 of the proem: agallomenai opi kalêi 
(“delighting in their sweet voice”). Cf. also Alcman, 27.1-2 (in Page 1962): “Come, Muse 
Calliope, daughter of Zeus, begin the lovely verses ?arch’ eratôn epeôn).” In general for 
Calliope, see Harriott 1969:16 ff. 
 
10
 aidoios basileus, l. 80. The king who has a claim to regard and reverence. Cf. 
Neitzel 1977:38 ff. 
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good, just, that is to say straight decisions (itheiêisi dikêisin, 86) in front of 
all the people in the agora, the speaking-place. The themistes are the 
“precepts of themis” and serve as points of reference to the magistrates. We 
may assume the existence of a repertory or a traditional stock of themistes, 
oral and memorized (Rudhardt 1999:30). The king as ruler has access to 
these themistes as well as to the scepter; he pronounces laws on behalf of 
Zeus. The description of Agamemnon in Iliad 9.97-99 provides an example:  
 
Most glorious son of Atreus, Agamemnon king of men,   
in you I shall end, from you I shall begin, because  
you are lord of many peoples, and Zeus has given you  
the scepter and the precedents, so that you might take counsel for them.11  
 
As mentioned above, Hesiod underlines the fact that the king must 
persuade the antagonists to accept his decisions. In other words, the king 
settles disputes, yet he does not deliver an authoritative judgment; he must 
try to justify his decision and for this justification he needs the help of the 
Muses. Hence the link between efficient speech and straight judgment. In 
particular, Calliope pours “sweet dew” on his tongue so that his words may 
flow sweetly and permit him to be a good arbitrator and bring a great quarrel 
(mega neikos, 87) to an end. Her very name provides Hesiod with a 
transition to the notion of persuasive speech, since it is in his voice that the 
king’s capacity of gentle persuasion resides. We must note that the justice 
Hesiod is trying to expound is closely related to the voice—spoken aloud, 
pronounced, declared or else listened to, heard and remembered; it is 
something performed. According to Havelock (1978:216), “the procedure of 
which dikê is a symbol is conducted by oral exchange” as practiced in a 
preliterate society. The king’s judgment is pronounced orally and thus his 
position before the people is one of a speaker before an audience.
12
 
                                                
11
 Italics mine; trans. by Thalmann 1984:141.  
 
12
 The etymology of Calliope’s name lies not only in voice, but in face or 
appearance as well; indeed, ops signifies not only “voice” but also “the eye, face” (see 
Liddell 1996, s.v.). So, we could say that Calliope is also the Muse “with the beautiful 
face” and in extension “with the beautiful appearance,” “with the appearance that 
delights.” Lines 84-85 of the Theogony underscore the importance of the visual here: oiJ 
dev te laoi; / pavnte~ ej~ aujto;n oJrw`si diakrivnonta qevmista~ (“all the people look 
towards him while he settles causes”). The “optical” elements have a real importance in 
the frame of the relation between speaker and audience; cf. Odyssey 8.170-71, a passage 
that is often studied as a parallel to Theogony 79-93, despite Calliope’s absence there: 
ajlla; qeo;~ morfh;n e[pesi stevfei, oiJ dev t? ej~ aujto;n ??terpovmenoi leuvssousin: 
(“but the god sets a crown of beauty upon his words, and men look upon with delight”). 
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Some critics go so far as to interpret Calliope’s patronage as the 
king’s dependence on the poet for the versification of his laws and decrees, 
but what is of interest for this discussion is rather the essence of persuasive 
speech, the essence of Calliope’s beautiful voice implying the powers of 
poetic speech, that is to say the particular qualities of rhythmical song, of 
metrical speech. Havelock has even argued that legal speech “must be 
metrical and formulaic; otherwise the utterance would not be the voice of the 
Muse.”
13
 From this point of view, when the king’s utterance is compared to 
a running river (line 84), we recognize the automatism of the performance. 
Oral composition is based on instantaneous creation by means of formulas 
and fixed patterns. This could be the meaning of the adverbs “soon” (aipsa), 
“quickly” (tacheôs), “easily” (rhêidiôs) in the text (lines 86, 90, 102, 103 
cited below) with both the king’s and the poet’s performance. Furthermore, 
these performances share the same positive results: as the king finds a 
solution for the external manifestations of social conflict, so the poet calms 
the internal symptoms of personal pain. They have the same ability to divert 
man’s mind from care (cf. metatropa in line 89 and paretrape in line 103 
below). As the former restores justice, so the latter restores serenity.
14
 When 
the poet sings, the listener forgets his cares.  
 
.   .   .   o} d? o[lbio~, o}n tina Mou`sai 
fivlwntai: glukerhv oiJ ajpo; stovmato~ rJevei aujdhv. 
eij gavr ti~ kai; pevnqo~ e[cwn neokhdevi qumw`/ 
a[zhtai kradivhn ajkachvmeno~, aujta;r ajoido;~ 
Mousavwn qeravpwn klevea protevrwn ajnqrwvpwn      100?
uJmnhvsh/ mavkarav~ te qeouv~, oi}  [Olumpon e[cousin, 
ai\y? o} ge dusfrosunevwn ejpilhvqetai oujdev ti khdevwn 
mevmnhtai: tacevw~ de; parevtrape dw`ra qeavwn. 
 
Happy is he whom the Muses love: sweet flows speech from his mouth. 
For though a man has sorrow and grief in his newly-troubled soul and 
lives in dread because his heart is distressed, yet, when a singer, the 
servant of the Muses, chants the glorious deeds of men of old and the 
                                                                                                                                            
For a discussion of the similarities between these two passages, see Martin 1984 and 
Neitzel 1977. 
 
13
 Havelock 1963:109. See also p. 111: “Only Calliope carries the name that 
identifies the verbal shapes which poetry commands. She is pre-eminently the symbol of 
its operational command of the formulas. She therefore is reserved for the princely 
function.” 
 
14
 Cf. Pucci 1977:29 ff. 
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blessed gods who inhabit Olympus, at once he forgets his heaviness and 
remembers not his sorrows at all; but the gifts of the goddesses soon turn 
him away from these.
15
 
 
The combination of Memory (Mnêmê) and Forgetting (Lêthê) is 
remarkable here: whoever hears the Muses, the daughters of Mnemosyne, no 
longer remembers his own ills. This particular dimension of remembering, 
from the standpoint of forgetting, stands in a particular relation to the speech 
of the king and oral justice. For example, Nereus, the old man of the sea, is 
praised later on in the poem as follows (Theogony, 233-36; trans. by Evelyn-
White 1982):  
 
And Sea begat Nereus, the eldest of his children, who is true (alêthea) and 
lies not: and men call him the Old Man because he is trusty and gentle and 
does not forget the laws of righteousness (oude themistôn lêthetai), but 
thinks just and kindly thoughts. 
 
The adjective “gentle” or “kind” (êpios) traditionally modifies a king 
and recalls the gracious words of the ideal ruler. It characterizes Nereus, 
who does not forget the themistes. His truthfulness, like that of the proem’s 
king, is directly related to the administration of justice (Walcot 1963:15). 
Indeed, the force of persuasion that distinguishes the oratorical function of 
the prince consists, as well, of a faultless speaking ability. In Hesiod’s proem 
we read that the king speaks “surely” (asphaleôs), that is to say unerringly; 
the idea of truth (alêtheia < ?+lêthê) is often associated with that of 
“certainty.” This alêtheia contrasts with erroneous thoughts that lead to 
injustice, because the ability to speak the truth unerringly implies, according 
to Hesiod, knowledge of what is just and proper.  
Herein lies another dimension of the ruler’s dependence on the Muses: 
the persuasive force of his speech is based on their knowledge of truth. In 
fact, thanks to the Muses the ruler does not forget what is just and proper. 
Memory is an essential faculty for him.
16
 
Furthermore, in some Greek cities the judicial officials were called 
mnêmones, “rememberers,” or hieromnêmones, “sacred rememberers.” 
                                                
15
 Theogony’s proem, lines 96-103 (trans. by Evelyn-White 1982). 
  
16
 Cf. Roth 1976:334: “Judges are those whose duty it is to remember these rules, 
to choose the right rule to apply in each case, and to hand down the collection of rules to 
the next generation.” See also the commentary by West (1966:183-84) on Theogony 85-
86. 
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According to Aristotle,
17
 these officials recorded the decisions of the courts, 
and they may belong to a period when certain magistrates were charged with 
remembering previous decisions as a service for judges; in so far as writing 
did not yet exist, they were adjuncts or living “records” for the magistrates.
18
 
Indeed, the institution of mnêmôn (from Mnêmê, Mnêmosunê) expresses the 
social function of memory. As Gernet notes (1981:235), “the mnêmôn is the 
person who protects the memory of the past with a view to affecting a 
decision in a court of law.” Under the heading mnêmôn, legend still 
remembers the “hero’s servant,” apparently a kind of clerk, of counselor, or 
a depository for divine advice whose memory is called on at the appropriate 
time (ibid.:235 and n. 54). In a text of Plutarch, we find an example of such 
a mnêmôn:  
 
But as for Achilles, it is said that his mother Thetis staidly forbade him to 
kill Tenes, since Tenes was honored by Apollo; and she commissioned 
one of the servants to be on guard, and to remind (hopôs ????????? kai 
anamimnêiskêi) Achilles lest he should unwittingly slay Tenes. But when 
Achilles was overrunning Tenedos and was pursuing Tenes’ sister, who 
was a beautiful maiden, Tenes met him and defended his sister; and she 
escaped, though Tenes was slain. When he had fallen, Achilles recognized 
him, and slew the servant because he had, although present, not reminded 
him (hoti parôn ouk anemnêse).19 
 
The transposition of the mnêmôn’s function or role from counselor to 
a larger juridical sphere may in part be explained by his obligation to 
remember what must not be forgotten, as, for example, the divine commands 
of Thetis, cited above. Rulers—kings and judges—are those whose duty is to 
remember the precepts of justice and to choose the right rule to apply in each 
case. And we may suppose that remembering is facilitated if these precepts 
are in verse.
20
 This could also be a way to explain the connection between 
                                                
17
 Politics, 1321b, 34-40. 
 
18
 See also Gagarin 1986:131.  
 
19
 Plutarch, Moralia, 297E-F (trans. by Babbit 1972). Other mnêmones are 
Spensitheos in Crete and Panamyes, Kasbollis’ son, in Hallicarnassus. Cf. Svenbro 
1988:67 and n. 45.  
 
20
 According to Plutarch again, poetry reinforces memory, which is the biggest 
service that it offers to language. See Moralia, 407F: “Then, besides, there is nothing in 
poetry more serviceable to language than the ideas communicated, by being bound up 
and interwoven with verse, are better remembered and kept firmly in mind (mallon 
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justice and poetry, between justice and the Muses, and especially the 
beautiful voice of Calliope. 
 
 
Solon’s Elegy to the Muses 
 
Another poet invokes the Muses when discussing justice: Solon, the 
Athenian lawgiver of the sixth century B.C.E. Tradition holds that he 
attempted to put his laws into epic verse, beginning them as follows: “First 
let us pray to King Zeus, son of Cronus, that he bestow good fortune and 
honour upon these ordinances (thesmois toisde).”21 Here again is a word that 
belongs to the family of themis (themistes): thesmos, “the ordinance,” that 
Solon uses to introduce his own laws.  
At the same time, Solon begins his most personal elegy with an 
invocation of the Muses, defining them by their Hesiodic parentage. He does 
not ask for poetic inspiration but calls upon them in their traditional capacity 
as the daughters of Memory. Moreover, he emphasizes their lineage in a 
particularly direct way, beginning his poem with the word and figure of 
Mnêmosunê:22  
 
Mnhmosuvnh~ kai; Zhno;~ jOlumpivou ajglaa; tevkna, 
   Mou`sai Pierivde~, klu`tev moi eujcwmevnw/: 
o[lbon moi pro;~ qew`n makavrwn dovte kai; pro;~ aJpavntwn 
   ajnqrwvpwn aijei; dovxan e[cein ajgaqhvn, 
ei\nai de; gluku;n w|de fivloi~, ejcqroi`si de; pikrovn,         5 
   toi`si me;n aijdoi`on, toi`si de; deino;n ijdei`n. 
 
Shining children of Memory and of Olympian Zeus, 
     Pierian Muses, hear me as I pray. 
Grant me prosperity at the hands of the blessed gods, 
     and always a good reputation at the hands of men;  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
mnêmoneuesthai kai krateisthai). Men in those days had to have a memory for many 
things (pollên edei mnêmên pareinai)” (italics mine; trans. by Babbit 1969). 
 
21
 Solon, fr. 40 Gentili and Prato 1988. See Plutarch, Life of Solon, 3. 5.  
 
22
 See the exceptionally complete commentary on lines 1-2 by Mülke (2002:244-
45). 
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and so to be sweet to friends and bitter to enemies, 
     an object of reverence to the former, but to the latter terrible to  
               look upon.
23
 
 
Solon is asking for things not ordinarily considered to be gifts of the 
Muses.
24
 He appeals to the Pierian goddesses not for the customary gift of 
poetic skill but for wealth and prosperity from the gods and for good 
reputation from men. For this reason, many scholars have found his opening 
address to the Muses puzzling, unexpected, and unrelated to the rest of the 
poem. Some have pointed out the formal character of the prayer;
25
 others, 
such as Almeida, have been left dumbfounded (2003:107): “The prayer is 
difficult because there is no precedent heretofore in Greek literature for such 
a request to these particular divinities whose province is oversight of musical 
production.” 
We could find an essential reason for Solon’s request to the Muses, 
however, by bearing in mind the particular conception of memory elaborated 
by Hesiod, within the framework of which memory is connected not only 
with poetry but also with justice. The Muses’ protection of oral justice is 
especially relevant in a poem composed by the reformer of Athens. Thus the 
elegy is not addressed to the Muses as goddesses of wisdom, as some have 
assumed (see Allen 1949:50), but rather as goddesses who favor the justice. 
Other elements in this elegy recall Hesiod’s proem to the Theogony: 
the notion of sweetness (glukun hôde philois, 5; cf. Theogony: glukerên 
cheiousin eersên, 83),26 the importance of olbos “prosperity” (line 3; cf. 
Theogony, 96: ho d’ olbios, hon tina Mousai philôntai), and the notion of 
respect (toisi men aidoion, 6; cf. Theogony, 80: basileusin aidoioisin). Solon 
desires a good name among men; as in Hesiod, the king, thanks to Calliope, 
who has the gift of eloquence and consequently the power of persuasion. In 
this way he earns the citizens’ respect as well as a good reputation. For 
Solon, who was both statesman and poet, this model would have had a 
special significance.  
                                                
23
 Solon, poem 1, 1-6 Gentili and Prato 1988 (trans. by Anhalt 1993:12). 
 
24
 For the presentation of this problem, see Anhalt 1993:11-12. 
 
25
 See, for example, van Groningen 1958:96, with n. 1. 
 
26
 Note here Solon’s poetic revision of the fundamental Greek principle of 
“helping friends and harming enemies” expressed especially with the adjectives kalos (to 
the friends) and kakos (to the enemies); see Blundell 1989:26 ff. Solon uses adjectives 
(glukus and pikros) specific to the language of poetry (cf., for example, Sappho, fr. 130 
Voigt 1971: glukupikron orpeton) and poetry’s effect on its listeners and their emotions. 
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Pindar’s Olympian 10 
  
 Pindar has composed this ode for the victory of the Locrian boy 
Agesidamos in an Olympic boxing contest in 476 B.C.E. As the poet moves 
to the first epode, he makes a reference to the muse Calliope, the only one in 
his work, in the framework of praising Epizephyrian Lokris, the home of 
Agesidamos. More precisely, Pindar extols the Lokrians’ sense of justice in 
human affairs (line 13) and their appreciation of the Muse Calliope (line 14) 
and Ares, the god of war (line 15): 
 
Nevmei ga;r ?Atrevkeia povlin 
Lokrw`n Zefurivwn, 
mevlei tev sfisi Kalliovpa 
kai; cavlkeo~ [Arh~. 
 
For the city of the Locrians of the West is the home of the  
      Goddess of Strictness, 
And dear to them are the Muse Calliope and the brazen  
      God of War.
27
 
 
 The meanings of atrekeia (line 13) vary between “truth” and “justice.” 
More precisely, it means “truth” in the sense of “straightforwardness,” and 
in the goddess Atrekeia, “Strict Justice,” there may be an allusion to the 
strictness of Zaleukos, the Lokrian lawgiver, the first to make written laws 
around the seventh century B.C.E.
28
 By using this word, Pindar emphasizes 
the respect of the Lokrians for precision and strictness, “in the present case, 
strictness in the administration of justice and honesty in commercial 
intercourse.”
29
 Moreover, Demosthenes declares that in more than 200 years 
only one law has been changed in Epizephyrian Lokris, saying that the 
Lokrians are not bold to propose new laws, but obey the old ones punctually 
(akribôs? chrôntai).30 Their reputation for respect of law is fitting in the 
                                                
27
 Trans. by Farnell 1930:57, altered concerning the translation of the word 
Atrekeia.  
 
28
 See the commentary of Gildersleeve 1885:215. For Zaleukos and his law code, 
see von Fritz 1983 and Adcock 1927:100-01. 
 
29
 Verdenius 1988:62. See also the city’s description by Nassen (1975:225-26).  
 
30
 Demosthenes, Against Timocrates, 140.  
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schema of justice as a topos in Pindar’s praise of cities and rulers.31 And we 
know that their city, thanks to the goddess of strictness, is well ordered 
(eunomos).32  
Within this framework, the mention especially of the muse Calliope 
just after Atrekeia must have a special signification. Commentators, in 
general, interpret Calliope’s mention as Pindar’s praise for the Lokrians’ 
artistic sensibility, as does Nassen (1975:226) who speaks of “the artistic 
sensitivity and refinement of a people who rival the Ionians in their tuneful 
harmony with the flute” and who will therefore be able to appreciate the 
song that Pindar has composed in their honor. With this meaning, Calliope 
represents the Muses in general,
33
 and the people’s care for her balances 
their care for Ares (Hubbard 1985:64 and n. 150). We may add that, in this 
case, Calliope does not represent simply appreciation of music belonging—
like justice and warlike spirit—to a topos for the praise of cities. She is not 
the equivalent of all the Muses or the heroic Muse. She is chosen because of 
her voice, which is also beautiful given that she bestows the gift of 
eloquence and persuasion as in the Hesiodic passage, and for this reason she 
is necessary for the application of eunomia inside the community of Lokris 
and for the maintenance of atrekeia. Besides, exactitude is also a quality of 
speech. The Lokrians are not “inexperienced in good things (mêd’ apeiraton 
kalôn; Pindar, Olympian 11.17)” because they have achieved a special 
harmony in artistic and political life.  
 
 
Empedocles’s fragment 131 
  
 From our point of view, it is significant that Empedocles, the 
Presocratic philosopher from the middle of the fifth century B.C.E., unlike 
Hesiod and Solon, chooses to invoke only one of the muses, Calliope,
34
 as 
we can see in fragment 131 Diels and Kranz (1951) where he mentions her 
name:  
 
                                                
31
 See, for example, Olympian 2.6; 13.6-7.  
 
32
 Moreover, Plato uses the superlative form of eunomos when describing Lokris: 
Timaeus, 20a: eunomôtatês poleôs, “a most well-governed city.”  
 
33
 For example, see the commentary of Verdenius 1988:62.  
 
34
 Few commentators have found this choice remarkable, but cf. Fakas 2001:60-
61, espec. n. 178. 
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eij ga;r ejfhmerivwn e{nekevn tino~, a[mbrote Mou`sa, 
hJmetevra~ melevta~ <a{de toi> dia; frontivdo~ ejlqei`n, 
eujcomevnw/ nu`n au\te parivstaso, Kalliovpeia, 
ajmfi; qew`n makavrwn ajgaqo;n lovgon ejmfaivnonti. 
 
If for the sake of any one of mortal men, immortal Muse, (it pleased you) 
that our cares came to your attention, now once more, Kalliopeia, answer 
a prayer, and stand by as a worthy account of the blessed gods is being 
unfolded.
35  
 
It is significant that Hippolytus, who transmits the fragment in the late 
second and early third centuries C.E., understands Empedocle’s Muse to be 
an allegory for the dikaios logos, “the just reason,” a principle that he 
describes as being between the antagonists Love and Strife. According to 
Hippolytus, “Empedocles, addressing this same just reason, which 
collaborates with love, as a Muse, also calls on her to collaborate with him” 
with the verses of the fragment above.
36
 Empedocles’ address to the muse of 
the beautiful voice takes the form of a prayer (euchomenôi nun aute 
paristaso, 3), as in Solon’s elegy (klute moi euchômenôi, 2); and as in this 
elegy, Empedocles evokes her traditional capacity as the daughter of 
Memory in another fragment. Indeed, in fragment 3 Diels and Kranz (1951), 
she is called polumnêstê, that is to say “much-remembering,” “mindful.”37 In 
this way, the main qualities of her persuasion-oriented speech are again 
apparent: the poet prays that his words may flow from his mouth 
(ocheteusate pêgên, 2). Here the stream of words is described not as “sweet” 
(in Hesiod: epi glôssêi glukerên cheiousin eersên, 83) but as “pure” (in 
Empedocles: katharên pêgên, 2) usually reserved for language of ritual.38 
We note also the word mania, “madness,” in the beginning of fragment 3, 
                                                
35
 Trans. by Wright 1995:159.  
 
36
 Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 7.31.3-4. See also the commentary on 
Hippolytus’ passage in Bollack (2003:91), who speaks about the “Muse conciliatrice” 
whose “dons de parole” are invoked in the text.  
 
37
 I find this meaning preferable to the meaning of the epithet in Homer (for 
example, Odyssey 4.770; 14.64): “much-wooed.” The text of Empedocles is as follows 
(fr. 3.1-5 Diels and Kranz 1951 [= 2 Wright 1995]), “But turn from my tongue, o gods, 
the madness of these men, and from hallowed lips let a pure stream flow. And I entreat 
you, virgin Muse, white-armed, of long memory, send of that which is right and fitting of 
mortals to hear, driving the well-reined chariot from the place of reverence” (trans. by 
Wright 1995:157).  
 
38
 See the commentary by Wright (1995:158). 
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which Empedocles uses to describe the transgression of boundaries of 
themis, of what is fitting and right. Empedocles prays against mania’s power 
and for that which is right for mortals to hear (line 4), reminiscent of the just 
speech invoked by Hesiod, a speech before an audience.  
This speech expresses the best decision between opposing claims, that 
is, a decision is taken impartially, based on the truth. Within this framework, 
Empedocles also, in another fragment, declares his belief that truth is in his 
words. At the same time, it is significant that he relates truth to the notion of 
persuasion, which means more precisely the effort on the part of the listeners 
to understand and to be convinced (pistis, “confidence”):39 
  
My friends, I know that there is truth in the words which I shall speak 
(alêtheiê para muthois hous egô eksereô), but indeed it comes hard for 
men, and the onrush of conviction (pistios hormê) to the mind is 
unwelcome.
40
 
 
Moreover, in fragment 146 Diels and Kranz (1951), Empedoles 
explores the relationship between the political leaders and the prophets and, 
more significantly from our standpoint, the poets (trans. by Wright 
1995:291): “And at the end they come among men on earth as prophets, 
minstrels (humnopoloi), physicians, and leaders (?????? anthrôpoisin), and 
from these arise as gods, highest in honor.” Empedocles himself played an 
important political role;
41
 he was neither statesman nor judge, but we know 
that, when signs of tyranny became clear in Acragas, he persuaded the 
citizens of Acragas to put an end to their seditions and to practice political 
equality:  
 
Neavnqh~ d? oJ Kuzikhno;~ oJ kai; peri; tw`n Puqagorikw`n eijpwvn 
fhsi Mevtwno~ teleuthvsanto~ turannivdo~ ajrch;n ujpofuvesqai: 
ei\ta to;n ?Empedokleva pei`sai tou;~ ?Akragantivnou~ pauvsqai me;n 
twn stavsewn,?? ijsovthta de; politikh;n ajskei`n. 
 
                                                
39
 The speech of Empedocles’ muse, that is to say Calliope, is significantly 
described as pistômata (from the same root as pistis), “assurances,” which justify such 
confidence once (fr. 4. 2 Diels and Kranz 1951: hêmeterês pistômata Mousês). See 
Verdenius 1948:11. 
 
40
 Fr. 114 Diels and Kranz 1951 (=103 Wright 1995); trans. by Wright 1995:267. 
 
41
 On Empedocles’ political life, see Bidez 1894:125 ff. 
 
42
 Cf. Theogony: kai; mevga nei`ko~ ejpistamevnw~ katevpausen, 87.  
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Neathes of Cyzicus, who tells about the Pythagoreans, relates that, after 
the death of Meton, the germs of a tyranny began to show themselves, that 
then it was Empedocles who persuaded the Agrigentines to put an end to 
their factions and cultivate equality in politics.43 
 
This is exactly the same role that Solon had been called on to play in 
Athens when there were signs of general uprising. Diogenes Laertius reports 
an incident, which shows that Empedocles was actively democratic and 
provides an example of his rhetorical performance in relation to justice. The 
philosopher had prosecuted two state officials for having introduced 
“tyrannical” manners in relation to their guests. The latter had been kept 
waiting, and when the wine was finally brought in they were ordered either 
to drink it or to have it poured over their heads: “For the time being 
Empedocles was reduced to silence; the next day he impeached both of 
them, the host and the master of the revels, and secured their condemnation 
and execution (eijsagagw;n eij~ dikasthvrion ajpevkteine katadikavsa~ 
ajmfotevrou~). This, then, was the beginning of his political career.”44  
Calliope recalls, once again, this specific relationship between 
persuasion and justice. Moreover, the role of this muse in Hesiod’s proem 
(lines 80-103) finds a particular extension in Empedocles’ philosophy: as the 
great quarrel is brought to an end by the speech of the king-judge (kai; 
mevga nei`ko~ ejpistamevnw~ katevpausen, 87), so in the philosopher’s 
fragments, the action of Strife, whose name is Neikos,45 is soothed by the 
force of Love (Philia).46 Another echo of Calliope’s function in a 
cosmological framework is the passage of Plato’s Phaedrus (259d), where 
she is especially connected to the Muse Urania (Ourania?ouranos, “the 
sky”) by Socrates:  
 
th/` de; presbutavth/ Kalliovph/ kai; th`/ met? aujth;n Oujraniva/, tou;~ 
ejn filosofiva/ diavgontav~ te kai; timw`nta~ th;n ejkeivnwn mousikh;n 
ajggevlousin, ai{ dh; mavlista tw`n Mousw`n peri; te oujrano;n kai; 
lovgou~ ou\sai qeivou~ te kai; ajnqrwpivnou~ iJa`si kallivsthn 
fwnhvn. 
 
                                                
43
 Diogenes Laertius, Lives 8.77 (trans. by Hicks 1958). 
 
44
 Diogenes Laertius, Lives 8.64 (trans. by Hicks 1958). 
 
45
 See, for example, fr. 17. 19; 35. 3; 36 Diels and Kranz 1951. 
 
46
 See the introduction by Wright (1995, espec. 30 ff.). 
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[…] And to Calliope, the eldest of the Muses, and to Urania who is next to 
her, they make report of those who pass their lives in philosophy and who 
worship these Muses who are most concerned with heaven and with 
thought divine and human and whose voice is the most beautiful.47 
 
In conclusion, we return to another passage in Hesiod’s Theogony 
(lines 901-03), which conveniently sums up our argument: 
 
Deuvteron hjgavgeto liparh;n qevmin, h} tevken  {Wra`~ 
Eujnomivhn te Divkhn te kai; Eijrhvnhn teqalui`an, 
ai{ e[rg? wjreuvousi kataqnhtoi`si brotoi`si. 
?
?ext he (Zeus) married bright Themis who bore the Horae (Hours), and 
Eunomia, Dikê (Justice), and blooming Eirênê (Peace), who mind the 
works of mortal men. 
 
Here, it is stated that Zeus’s second wife, after Mnemosyne, is Themis and 
that from their union were born the Hours, Eunomia, Justice, and Peace; 
Eunomia, the “Lawfulness,” represents communal life regulated by good 
laws and customs.
48
 Justice and Peace are inherent qualities of this goddess. 
 The examples of oral justice that we have examined exemplify a 
special kind of speech capable of expounding right choices and of 
persuading conflicting parties to make a peaceful settlement of their claims. 
As long as this type of justice is preserved intact, discord and strife, quarrels 
and seditions are unknown, thus giving a precise meaning to the “beauty”  
offered by Calliope, the Muse of “the beautiful voice.”49 
 
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris 
 
 
 
 
                                                
47
 Trans. by Fowler 1960, modified slighlty. 
 
48
 Cf. Pindar, Olympian 9.15-16, who speaks about Themis and her glorious 
daughter, the Savior Eunomia: a{n Qevmi~ qugavthr tev oiJ swvteira 
levlogcen/megalovdoxo~ Eujnomiva.  
 
49
 This article is developed from a paper I delivered at the international 
conference on “Orality and Literacy: Memory” at Rice University in October 2003. I am 
very grateful to Jesper Svenbro and Jean-Claude Picot for their attentive reading of my 
text and their comments. 
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